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I. INTRODUCTION
A person is illegally fired and, as a result, becomes unemployed
for a period of time. If that person wins a lawsuit based on that illegal
firing, she can typically recover what she would have earned in wages
during that time, as well as reasonable expenses she incurred to
search for a new job. Involuntary unemployment, however, also
causes people to lose psychological well-being, because they are
forced to suffer the experience of being unemployed while they look
for a new job. That loss ("unemployment distress") can range in
severity from feelings of anxiety and humiliation to severe
depression.' Accordingly, if a defendant should pay the plaintiff
enough to put her in the position she would have been in absent the
defendant's illegal firing, that may imply also awarding the plaintiff
damages in an amount proportionate to the unemployment distress
that the illegal firing caused her to suffer.
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. For comments on prior
drafts, thanks to Rafael Gely and Peter Siegelman.
1. E.g., Alan B. Krueger & Andreas I. Mueller, Time Use, Emotional Well-Being, and
Unemployment: Evidence from Longitudinal Data, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 594 (2012); Connie R.
Wanberg, The Individual Experience of Unemployment, 63 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 369 (2012);
Cristobal Young, Losing a Job: The Nonpecuniary Cost of Unemployment in the United States,
91 Soc. FORCES 609 (2012).
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This paper argues that when a defendant's illegal conduct caused
the plaintiff to be unemployed, judges and juries can and should
presume that the plaintiff suffered an amount of unemployment
distress specified by a dollar amount (the "presumed amount"). This
presumed amount is the product of (1) the average unit cost for
"unemployment distress," that is, a constant dollar amount for every
unit of time that the person is unemployed, as estimated based on
past awards for unemployment distress and (2) the amount of time
the plaintiff actually spent unemployed.
By definition, a legal presumption is a rule of law that, given
certain evidence (the proven fact), a judge or jury must accept
another fact (the presumed fact) as true, unless the other party at
least produces enough evidence that the fact to be presumed is
actually not true (and thereby rebuts the presumption). Accordingly,
once the unemployment distress presumption triggers, the burden of
production would shift to the defendant and the plaintiff to provide
enough evidence that the plaintiff suffered less or more than the
presumed amount, respectively. If no party rebuts the resumption,
then the judge must award the presumed amount for the plaintiff's
unemployment distress.
This unemployment distress presumption has three relative
advantages over other broader proposals to guide or restrict how
much judges and juries award noneconomic damages generally. First,
it is simpler for judges and juries to understand and apply. Second, it
will likely have an anchoring effect on juries, and thereby make
unemployment distress awards more predictable. This effect partly
addresses worries that if the law changes to make it easier for illegally
fired plaintiffs to receive emotional distress damages, including
damages for unemployment distress, employers would face more
legal uncertainty. Third, the unemployment distress presumption can
better fit federal and state constitutional law than other attempts to
constrain jury discretion to award damages.
The paper proceeds as follows. Part II describes how existing
common law makes it difficult for plaintiffs to obtain damages for
unemployment distress and what might partly explain such judicial
resistance. Part III explains the unemployment distress presumption.
Part IV identifies the presumption's relative advantages.
II. BACKGROUND
This section motivates the unemployment distress presumption
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in light of existing obstacles in contract and tort law to recovering
damages for unemployment distress. Contract law disfavors
emotional distress damages in general as a remedy for contract
claims, while tort law - which generally allows for emotional distress
damages - does not make it easy to win a tort claim for wrongful
discharge. This section also distinguishes the unemployment distress
presumption from other broader proposals for making jury awards
for noneconomic damages more uniform and predictable.
Under existing state contract and tort law, it is difficult for
illegally fired workers to recover emotional distress damages
generally, and thus damages for unemployment distress in particular.
First, consider contract law. In the early twentieth century,
McCormick speculated that courts "might expand" damages for a
breach-of-employment-contract claim by recognizing that
"deprivation of a job, if more than a casual one, not only affects
usually a man's reputation and prestige, but ordinarily may so shake
his sense of security as to inspire, even in men of firmness, deep fear
and distress."2
Eighty years later, that has not happened. Today, many state
appellate courts still read state contract law to deny emotional
distress damages for claims that an employer breached the plaintiff's
employment contract.3 This is consistent with general judicial
declarations that emotional distress damages hall not be awarded for
contract claims generally unless the parties expressly agree otherwise.
Legal commentators, however, have long complained that, in fact, the
actual case law is equivocal and admits of many exceptions, such as
for when the breach is willful and wanton, when emotional distress is
a foreseeable consequence or particularly likely result of the breach,
or when the contract implicates "personal" or "family" interests.4
2. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 639 (1935).
3. E.g., Carraway Methodist Health Sys. v. Wise, 986 So.2d 387, 398-400 (Ala. 2007); E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 445 (Del. 1996); Howard Univ. v. Batten,
632 A.2d 389, 392-93 & n.5 (D.C. 1993); Valentine v. Gen. Am. Credit, Inc., 362 N.W.2d 628,
631 (Mich. 1984); Silva v. Albuquerque Assembly & Distrib. Freeport Warehouse Corp., 738
P.2d 513, 514 (N.M. 1987); Gaglidari v. Denny's Rests., Inc., 815 P.2d 1362, 1370-74 (Wash.
1991). But see Allabashi v. Lincoln Nat'l Sales Corp., 824 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo. App. 1991)
(recoverable when breach of employment contract is willful and wanton); Morris Newspaper
Corp. v. Allen, 932 So.2d 810, 819 (Miss. App. 2005) (damages for mental anguish available for
breach of employment contract if plaintiff proves "that mental anguish was a foreseeable
consequence of the particular breach" and that "she actually suffered mental anguish").
4. E.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at 592-98; Ronnie Cohen & Shannon O'Byrne, Cry
Me a River: Recovery of Mental Distress Damages in a Breach of Contract Action - A North
American Perspective, 42 AM. BUS. L.J. 97 (2005); David A. Hoffman & Alexander S. Radus,
Instructing Juries on Noneconomic Contract Damages, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1221 (2012); Mara
20}15]
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Meanwhile, appellate judges rarely explain why contract law should
bar emotional distress damages for employment contract claims in
particular. When they do, the reasoning is largely opaque or
conclusory'
Second, the existing common law of tort makes it difficult to win
a wrongful discharge tort, and thus recover damages for
unemployment distress. Unlike eighty years ago, today over thirty-
five states recognize a common law tort action for retaliatory or
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.6 If the plaintiff
establishes liability under such a tort claim, current law seems to let
that plaintiff receive the types of damages generally available in tort
actions, including but not limited to damages for emotional distress.7
Thus, in theory, such tort claims, if successful, could let plaintiffs
recover damages for unemployment distress in particular. The
obstacle: Depending upon the state, the tort law for wrongful
discharge claims can be fairly stringent as to what kinds of employer
conduct qualify as "wrongful"; how hard it is to show that an
employer's firing contravened "public policy"; or whether a parallel
statutory remedy is deemed adequate enough to preclude the tort
claim, even if that statutory remedy provides less than the remedies
available for the tort claim.8
Judges may persist in maintaining these contract and tort
doctrinal barriers to recovering unemployment distress damages in
Kent, The Common-Law History of Non-Economic Damages in Breach of Contract Actions
Verusus Willful Breach of Contract, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 481 (2005); John D. McCamus,
Mechanisms for Restricting Recovery for Emotional Distress in Contract, 42 LOYOLA L.A. L.
REV. 51 (2008).
5. E.g., Valentine, 362 N.W.2d at 631; Gaglidari, 815 P.2d at 1370-74.
6. LEx K. LARSON, UNJUST DISMISSAL §§ 10.1-10.52 (2014).
7. Francis M. Dougherty, Damages Recoverable for Wrongful Discharge of At-Will
Employee, 44 A.L.R.4th 1131, § 9 (1986 & Supp. 2014). E.g., Niblo v. Parr Mfg., Inc., 445
N.W.2d 351, 355-56 (Iowa 1989); Phillips v. Butterball Farms Co., 531 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Mich.
1995); Chavez v. Manville Prods. Corp., 777 P.2d 371, 377-78 (N.M. 1989); Blakely v. Town of
Taylortown, 756 S.E.2d 878, 883 (N.C. App. 2014); Dunwoody v. Handskill Corp., 60 P.3d 1135,
1141 (Or. 2003); Cagle v. Burns & Roe, Inc., 726 P.2d 434, 438 (Wash. 1986). In contrast,
employment law statutes vary. For examples, Title VII authorizes emotional distress damages,
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), (b)(3) (2012), but the Age Discrimination in Employment Act does
not, see Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 326 & n.2 (1995) (collecting
cases), and the Family and Medical Leave Act does not, see Deborah F. Buckman, Award of
Damages Under Family and Medical Leave Act (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601 et seq.), 176 A.L.R. Fed.
591, § 10 (2002 & Supp. 2014) (collecting cases). Courts vary as to whether they read the Fair
Labor Standards Act's retaliation provision to authorize such damages. Compare Moore v.
Freeman, 355 F.3d 558, 563-64 (6th Cir. 2004) (yes); Travis v. Gary Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc., 921
F.2d 108, 111-12 (7th Cir.1990) (same) with Douglas v. Mission Chevrolet, 757 F. Supp. 2d 637,
640 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (no).
8. LARSON, supra note 6.
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part because they have this worry: There is a large set of potential
illegal firing lawsuits (with or without merit), because about twenty
million people in the US are fired or laid off by private employers
every year.9 That is about four times the annual number of motor
vehicle crashes.'
Accordingly, judges may worry that if they make it easier for
illegally fired plaintiffs to receive emotional distress damages, they
will thereby cause a lot more legal uncertainty for employers. In
particular, since the true emotional distress level is hard to verify,
judges may believe that pre-existing juror sympathies and prejudices
cause jury awards for noneconomic damages to vary considerably. As
that variance increases, it becomes harder for employers and their
lawyers to estimate their liability risk. To be sure, in personal injury
cases, noneconomic damages awards are substantially influenced by
more predictable case characteristics, including case type, the severity
of any accompanying physical injury, and the size of any economic
damages award.11 In contrast, in illegal firing cases, physical injury is
rare, and thus distress damages in those cases may be harder to
predict.2
In response to similar concerns about noneconomic damages
generally, many have offered proposals for making jury awards for
noneconomic damages more uniform and predictable, albeit usually
for noneconomic damages that accompany physical injury. 3 Some
9. For the period 2004-2014, the annual number of "layoffs and discharges" reported by
all private employers in the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey was on average about
20.7 million. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Job Openings and Labor Turnover
Survey Database, <http://www.bls.gov/jlt/data.htm> (Series Id: JTUIOOOOOOOLDL) (last visited
May 4, 2015).
10. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS
2012: A COMPILATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH DATA FROM THE FATALITY ANALYSIS
REPORTING SYSTEM AND THE GENERAL ESTIMATES SYSTEM 17 tbl. 1 (2014).
11. Herbert M. Kritzer et al., An Exploration of "Noneconomic" Damages in Civil Jury
Awards, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 971 (2014).
12. Judges may also believe that if a change in law (as to either liability or damages) makes
it easier for fired plaintiffs to get distress damages, more meritless legal claims that would not
have otherwise been filed will be filed as a result, because that legal change increases the
expected value of those otherwise unfiled claims. This assumes that these otherwise unfiled
claims must themselves be mostly meritless - a strong yet testable premise of overclaiming
arguments generally. Sachin S. Pandya & Peter Siegelman. Underclaiming and Overclaiming, 38
LAW & SOC. INOUIRY 836 (2013). If not, we might welcome the more claims filed as correcting
for systematic underclaiming.
13. For example, the hedonic damages approach depends in part on a lost-pleasure-of-life
scale to measure the severity of that harm, which in turn was developed based on how mental
health clinicians responded to hypothetical vignettes concerning loss of pleasure of life resulting
from physical injuries. Paul Andrews et al., Development of the Lost Pleasure of Life Scale, 20
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 99 (1996). Similarly, the health utilities approach to non-economic losses
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propose guiding juries by giving them information on past jury awards
for noneconomic damages.14 For example, Chase suggested providing
juries with a grid that sorts prior jury awards for non-economic
damages in the same state by a nine-category injury-severity scale and
by plaintiff-age brackets, and then reports, for each cell on the grid,
the median, maximum, and minimum past award.15 Bovbjerg et al.
suggested using past awards for noneconomic damages to create a
matrix of dollar values based on plaintiff age and severity of injury in
two dimensions ("permanent" vs. "temporary" and "major" v.
"minor").16 They also suggested creating, as nonbinding guides for
juries, nine hypothetical vignettes of physical injuries and their
corresponding noneconomic damage awards.
1 7
Far fewer proposals suggest using past jury awards to constrain
jury discretion to award noneconomic damages in a particular case.
For example, Blumstein et al. proposed using the 25th and 75th
percentiles of a distribution of prior noneconomic damage awards
(conditional on injury severity) to set presumed minimum and
maximum noneconomic damage awards.18 Juries would be instructed
as to amounts at the 25th and 75th percentiles for the level of injury
severity that matched the plaintiff's injury. Then, for any jury verdict
above or below these "boundary points," the jury would have to
justify the deviation to the judge, or alternatively the "[e]xtreme
values should constitute a prima facie case" for additur or remittitur.19
favored by Studdert et al. relies on assigning ratings to health states with respect to populations
that suffered emotional harm that accompanied bodily injuries and pursued worker
compensation claims or medical malpractice claims as a result. David Studdert et al.,
Rationalizing Noneconomic Damages: A Health-Utilities Approach, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 2011, at 82-100. Avraham proposed calculating pain-and-suffering damages with a
system of nonbinding age-adjusted multipliers associated with the medical costs of a physical
injury. Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A Critique of the
Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal for Change, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 87, 110-17
(2006).
14. Some jurisdictions, such as England and Northern Ireland, publish guidelines for
judges for awarding damages in personal injury cases by reporting damage award ranges,
indexed by injury type and severity, based on past awards. 11 JUDICIAL COLL., GUIDELINES
FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF GENERAL DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES (2012); 4 THE
JUDICIAL STUDIES BD. FOR N. IR., GUIDELINES FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF GENERAL
DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES IN NORTHERN IRELAND (2013).
15. Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 763, 777-78 (1995).
16. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling Pain and
Suffering, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 939-53 (1988).
17. Id. at 953-56.
18. James F. Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better Tools for Asessing
Damages for Personal Injury, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 171,177-88 (1991).
19. Id. at 182.
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III. DISCUSSION
A. The Unemployment Distress Presumption
This section proposes the unemployment distress presumption
and explains how it operates. In particular, it shows how the proposed
presumption accounts for the fact that we cannot directly measure the
plaintiff's unemployment distress and that there is no uniform
distress-to-dollars exchange rate, that is, no uniform way to monetize
the total distress suffered.
To start, imagine that you become unemployed because of an
illegal firing. Now, imagine your unemployment distress level while
you are unemployed, that is, the distress suffered because you are
unemployed at that time. This distress level may vary by person and
over the time spent unemployed. Maybe you felt the same distress
level the whole time you were unemployed (Figure 1(a)). Or maybe
your distress level increased as your unemployment persisted, despite
your best efforts to get a new job (Figure 1(b)). Or maybe after a
certain period of feeling worse over time, you began to adjust, which
is why your level of distress increased at first but then slowly waned
(Figure 1(c)).
Figure 1: Hypothetical Change in Unemployment Distress over Time
(a) (b) (C)
100 100 100
801 80 80 1
- I
60- 60 60
40 40 401 -
20 2 0
200
0 0 -/0'0 2 4 0 2 4 0 2 4
time time time
To get the total unemployment distress you suffered, whatever
that is, we would simply sum the units of distress you suffered at each
moment over the total time spent unemployed. To monetize that sum,
we would multiply it by a distress-to-dollars exchange rate. The result:
A money amount that roughly matches the plaintiff's unemployment
distress cost.This formulation faces two main obstacles. First, we
currently cannot directly observe any particular individual's true level
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of unemployment distress at different points in time. Second, there is
no explicit and agreed upon distress-to-dollars exchange rate. To
overcome these obstacles, we can estimate the average unit cost of
unemployment distress based on all past awards for unemployment
distress in which the jury (or, in a bench trial, the judge) specifically
identified unemployment distress as a separate item of damages.
To do this, we take prior awards for unemployment distress
received by everyone in the population of prevailing plaintiffs and
assume that each such award is the product of (1) a plaintiff-specific
unit cost of unemployment distress and (2) the total number of
eligible periods of time the plaintiff was unemployed. Since we do
know the eligible period of unemployment for each past award, we
can calculate the unit cost for each award and then the average unit
cost for unemployment distress for those awards. Finally, we set the
presumed amount for any particular plaintiff as the product of the
average unit cost and the amount of eligible time that this plaintiff
spent unemployed.
To illustrate, Table 1 reports a hypothetical set of past inflation-
adjusted awards for unemployment distress and, for each award, the
number of days unemployed that were eligible for compensation.
Table 1: Hypothetical Past Awards for Unemployment Distress
Award Award Time Unemployed Unit Cost
No. Amount (days) time)
1 $ 15,000 150 $ 100.00
2 $25,000 60 $416.67
3 $ 10,000 200 $ 50.00
4 $6,500 14 $464.29
5 $ 1,500 20 $75.00
For these awards, the average unit cost of unemployment distress is $
221.19 (= (100 + 416.67 + 50 + 464.29 + 75) + 5).
Now, suppose a particular case in which a plaintiff suffered thirty
days of unemployment because of the defendant-employer's illegal
firing, and that all those days are eligible for compensation. If so,
under the unemployment distress presumption, the presumed
damages in that case are $ 221.19 x 30 = $ 6,635.70. If the number of
eligible days of unemployment is disputed, the judge would instruct
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the jury on the presumed amount as a "per diem" calculation
($221.19 per day unemployed).
This approach also applies to damages for future
unemployment distress, that is, the estimated time after final
judgment that the plaintiff will be unemployed. For example, if the
plaintiff receives front pay for a two-week period,2" and the average
unit cost for unemployment distress is $ 221.19/day, then the plaintiff
is presumed to suffer $ 3,096.66 (= $ 221.19 x 14) worth of
unemployment distress for those two weeks.
Unlike time periods for calculating lost wages (before or after
final judgment), the unemployment distress time period includes all
the periods of time that the plaintiff is unemployed. That includes
time periods for which the plaintiff would not have worked even if the
illegal firing had not occurred, because unemployment distress does
not temporarily cease on the days the plaintiff would have had off
from work. In our example, if the plaintiff would not have worked on
weekends, her front pay award would cover ten days (weekdays
only), but her future unemployment distress award would cover all
fourteen days (weekdays and weekends).
Overall, this approach assumes that for any distribution of
past jury awards for unemployment distress, although awards vary by
the amount of total unemployment distress suffered, the distress-to-
dollars exchange rate is the same for every past award. Put another
way, suppose a single jury decided all awards and could directly
observe the total unemployment distress suffered by each plaintiff
who received an award. Although that jury could use different
exchange rates for different plaintiffs, it should not. As between two
people who suffer the exact same level of distress, there is no
difference between those people that justifies making one person's
distress worth more (in money) than the other. This moral norm, in
turn, may rise to the status of constitutional law by operation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution and its state
constitution equivalents. Accordingly, we proceed as if past juries
applied the same distress-to-dollars exchange rate to all plaintiffs.
We could relax this assumption by, for example, relying only
on the subset of past jury awards that judges approve on appeal. The
premise here is that such judicially approved awards are more likely
20. Typically, where reinstatement is an impractical remedy, prevailing plaintiffs may
instead receive an award for future lost wages (sometimes called "front pay"), that is, wage
losses caused by the defendant's wrongful conduct, but which are expected to occur only after
final judgment.
94 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 19:85
to resemble what our hypothetical juries would award after applying a
uniform distress-to-dollars exchange rate. There is no way to test this
premise. After all, it is equally plausible that judges - fearing, say,
jury prejudice against defendants - would tend to disapprove or
reduce what our hypothetical juries would award. Moreover, since
there are fewer judicially approved past jury awards, we have fewer
awards from which to calculate average unit cost. The resulting
estimate of average unit cost will be more sensitive to (judicially
approved) outliers than an average unit cost based on all past awards,
whether or not judicially approved. Finally, if parties tend to seek
appellate review of larger jury awards than smaller ones, then the
average judicially approved award may be higher than the average of
all such awards. It is unclear, however, whether these consequences of
relying on judicially approved awards leads to more bias overall,
because we cannot directly observe the true distress level suffered by
the plaintiffs who received those awards.
Once we calculate the presumed amount, the burden of
production shifts to the parties. Now, both plaintiff and defendant can
seek to rebut that presumed amount by offering competing damage
estimates, based on evidence of how much the plaintiff's actual unit
cost of unemployment distress departs from the average unit cost of
distress.
To do this, a defendant could argue that the plaintiff's distress
while unemployed was not unemployment distress in particular,
because something else (other than being unemployed at that time)
caused that distress. Suppose that during the period of
unemployment, the plaintiff's close friend or relative died in a car
accident, and the plaintiff suffered emotional distress after that event
occurred. If that event occurred independently of the defendant's
illegal act (e.g., the illegal firing) and if the plaintiff would have felt no
less distress had he been employed during that time, then proof of
that distress is not proof of unemployment distress.
Alternatively, either party could offer evidence that
unemployment distress does indeed systematically vary by some
characteristic, such as the plaintiff's age or sex, and therefore the
plaintiff should be awarded more (or less) than the presumed amount
because he shares (or lacks) that salient characteristic.
Furthermore, the defendant can invoke the avoidable
consequences rule. That rule, as applied to awards of lost wages,
usually demands that, after becoming unemployed, the plaintiff
exercise reasonable diligence to obtain comparable employment in
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the local area, and reduces the total award by the amount of wages
that, with such reasonable diligence, would not have been lost.21 In so
doing, this rule reduces the eligible time periods for calculating lost
wages. The rule already applies to lost wages awards for, among other
claims, breach-of-employment-contract claims,2 as well as claims
under various employment law statutes.3
As applied here, to rebut the presumed amount, the defendant
must show that the time the plaintiff spent unemployed that is eligible
for compensation under the avoidable consequences rule is less than
the time the plaintiff actually spent unemployed. For example, if the
plaintiff had unreasonably stopped searching for a comparable job
half way through the unemployment period, she cannot receive
damages for unemployment distress for the second half of her period
of unemployment, if had the plaintiff done otherwise, she would have
been employed-and therefore would not have suffered
unemployment distress -during that second half.
Finally, to implement the approach here, two initial conditions
must hold. First, there must be an initial period of time (a "burn-in"
period") during which the unemployment distress presumption would
not be in effect. During this burn-in period, a jury, if asked to award
damages for unemployment distress, would complete a special verdict
form. That form would ask them to separately find both the total time
unemployed under the avoidable consequences rule as well as the
total of unemployment distress as distinct from other types of
emotional distress suffered. During this period, to avoid any
distortion, the jury will not be told that its unemployment distress
award will provide data for calculating the presumed amount in later
cases in which the unemployment distress presumption does apply.
Second, both data points for each such award must be
collected and stored in a public database of jury verdicts that lawyers
can easily access. To be sure, the judicial system must bear the cost of
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. f (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. c, illus. 8 (1981). Kelly derives the avoidable consequences rule for
breach-of-employment-contract claims from enforcement of the expectation interest in contract
damages. Michael B. Kelly, Living Without the Avoidable Consequences Doctrine in Contract
Remedies, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175,206-25 (1996).
22. William H. Danne, Jr., Nature of Alternative Employment Which Employee Must
Accept to Minimize Damages for Wrongful Discharge, 44 A.L.R.3d 629 (1972 & Supp. 2014)
(collecting cases).
23. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-86(b) (2014); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219,
231 (1982) (Title VII); Buckman, supra note 7, §§ 11-12 (collecting FMLA cases); Dominic v.
Consol. Edison Co., 822 F.2d 1249, 1258 (2d Cir. 1987) (as applied to front pay award under Age
Discrimination in Employment Act).
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building and maintaining this database, but that cost also exists for
the many different prior proposals for guiding or constraining jury
discretion that rely on inferences from past jury awards.24 Given the
special verdict form and the database, for time periods after the burn-
in period, anyone can easily calculate the average unit cost of
unemployment distress. The database can be updated either
continuously or at intervals (say, every five years) to reflect the most
recent distribution of past awards for unemployment distress.
B. Advantages
This section identifies the advantages of the unemployment
distress presumption. First, it is relatively easy for judges and juries to
understand and apply. Second, its likely anchoring effect on juries will
tend to make unemployment distress awards more predictable. Third,
the unemployment distress presumption better fits federal and state
constitutional law as compared to other laws that constrain jury
discretion to award damages.
1. Simplicity
The unemployment distress presumption is simple, but that
simplicity comes at a price. It is simple as compared to other
proposals to guide or constrain juries based on past jury awards. At
worst, juries must multiply the (pre-provided) average unit distress
cost by the number of compensable time periods the plaintiff spent
unemployed under the avoidable consequences rule. The cognitive
burden is low. There is no need to index past unemployment distress
awards by age and physical injury severity, because bodily injury
rarely occurs in illegal firing cases and because there is little research
to date to suggest that unit distress level for unemployment distress
systematically varies with the plaintiff's age. Thus, there is no need to
present juries with complex matrices or award ranges keyed to
hypothetical injury vignettes. And unlike other proposals, juries
would not be instructed about the shape or other characteristics of
the distribution of past awards for unemployment distress, such as its
mean, median, upper, and lower bounds. This is a feature. Jurors may
not fully understand what a median is or how it differs from the mean
of the distribution of past awards. Indeed, some studies find that even
24. E.g., Bovbjerg et al., supra note 16, at 960-61.
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prospective math teachers have an incomplete conceptual grasp of
mean and median as different measures of central tendency.25
The price for this simplicity is a narrow scope. The presumption
applies only to unemployment distress damages, that is, for distress
suffered for a time because the plaintiff was unemployed during that
time. Indeed, the presumed amount is simple to calculate precisely
because it is a function of a quantity that is relatively easy to
determine - the amount of time the plaintiff spent unemployed. As a
result, the presumed amount cannot well account for items of distress
that are not functions of the time spent unemployed. Thus, the
presumed amount does not account for the distress of how the
defendant illegally fired the plaintiff. And it does not account for the
distress of being unemployed that persists after the period of
unemployment ends and the plaintiff finds a new job.26 In principle,
these items of emotional distress were also caused by the defendant's
illegal conduct, and therefore they also should be compensable. The
unemployment distress presumption does not preclude separate
damage awards for these items of distress. Rather, for simplicity's
sake, the presumption just does not account for them at all.
2. Anchoring
Even if rebutted, the unemployment distress presumption
may favorably function as a nonstrategic anchor for damage awards
for unemployment distress. Civil jury research suggests that when
lawyers suggest damage amounts to juries as a lump sum (ad
damnum)27 or a constant dollar amount per unit of time (per diem),
28
juries tend to adjust how much they award in terms of how close it is
to the suggested award.29 Indeed, some studies find that damages
25. Randall E. Groth & Jennifer A. Bergner, Preservice Elementary Teachers Conceptual
and Procedural Knowledge of Mean, Median, and Mode, 8 MATHEMATICAL THINKING &
LEARNING 37 (2006); Juan Jcsfis Ortiz de Haro & Vicen Font Moll, Pre-Service Teachers'
Common Content Knowledge Regarding the Arithmetic Mean, 3 REDIMAT-J. RES. IN
MATHEMATICS EDUC. 192 (2014).
26. Such post-unemployment suffering often occurs, as indicated by the net loss in
subjective well-being of an unemployed person even after she finds a new job. See Young, supra
note 1, at 624.
27. E.g., John E. Campbell et al., Countering the Plaintiffs Anchor: Jury Simulations to
Evaluate Damages Arguments, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2470066>; Shari Seidman Diamond et
al., Damage Anchors on Real Juries, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 148 (Supp. 2011); Bradley D.
McAuliff & Brian H. Bornstein, All Anchors Are Not Created Equal: The Effects of Per Diem
Versus Lump Sum Requests on Pain and Suffering Awards, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 164 (2010).
28. McAuliff & Bornstein, supra note 27.
29. For discussion, sec EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN. DETERMINING DAMAGES:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY AWARDS 150-56 (2003). On the anchoring effect generally, see
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caps, when mock jurors are made aware of them, exert an anchoring
effect as well.3° This research suggests that, even if rebutted, the
unemployment distress presumption's presumed amount, expressed
as either a per-diem or a lump sum, may have an anchoring effect on
the final award for unemployment distress.
In other contexts, an anchoring effect is a disadvantage, a bias
to be reduced, or for plaintiffs' lawyers, a strategy in closing
arguments to get higher awards. Here, however, any biasing caused
by the anchoring effect cannot be directly verified, since we cannot
directly observe the plaintiff's true distress level. Still, the
presumption's estimate of average unit cost is likely to function as a
nonstrategic anchor that reduces, if not bias, then the variance of
these awards overall. Once the presumption goes into effect in a
jurisdiction, different juries in that jurisdiction will be presented with
the same estimate of average-unit-distress-cost, and that estimate will
update only to account for recent jury awards for unemployment
distress. If judges indeed worry that a change in law will increase legal
uncertainty because emotional distress jury awards tend to exhibit
high variance, then the presumption, by reducing that variance,
thereby reduces such legal uncertainty about unemployment distress
damages.
3. Constitutionality
This section discusses how the unemployment distress
presumption fits with federal and state constitutional law as
compared to other legal rules that constrain jury discretion to award
damages. Like damages caps, damage schedules, and other measures
that constrain jury discretion to award damages, the presumption, if
unrebutted, requires judges and juries to accept a determinate
amount - here, the average unit cost of distress multiplied by the time
spent unemployed - as the true cost of the plaintiff's unemployment
distress. In another respect, however, constitutional law tends to treat
rebuttable presumptions differently, on the premise that even when
they operate, the parties still may present evidence to rebut the fact to
be presumed. In this respect, some courts emphasize that legislatures
have the general authority over evidentiary rules, of which rebuttable
Adrian Furnham & Hua Chu Boo, A Literature Review of the Anchoring Effect, 40 J. SocIo-
ECON. 35 (2011).
30. Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom: The
Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353 (1999); Michael J. Saks et
al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 243 (1997).
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presumptions are a kind. Accordingly, the courts have long declared
constitutional law that only requires, for rebuttable presumptions,
that there is a "rational" or "reasonable" connection between the
proven fact that triggers the presumption and the fact to be presumed
as true.31
As a result, the unemployment distress presumption, because
it is rebuttable, can largely sidestep the main grounds that courts have
accepted for finding that a statutory noneconomic damages cap
violates constitutional law. 32 First, the cap may violate a state
constitution's equal protection guarantee, because no government
interest suffices to justify treating plaintiffs who suffer harm so severe
as to exceed the cap differently than the plaintiffs who suffer
noneconomic harm that falls below the cap.33 Second, the cap may
violate the state constitution's guarantee of a right of access to courts
for redress of a particular injury.34 Third, by requiring a court to
reduce a jury's noneconomic damages award, the cap may violate the
state constitution's provision for a right to a jury trial in civil cases by
supplanting the jury's own findings regarding damages, thereby
burdening or impairing the jury's fact-finding function.35 Fourth, by
enacting the cap, the legislature may violate the separation of powers
required by the state constitution, because the cap in effect usurps the
distinctively judicial power of remittitur, that is, the power to reduce a
jury's damage award for being excessive as a matter of law.36 Fifth,
some state constitutions expressly prohibit statutory limitation on
37damages for injury to any person.
31. K.A. Drechsler, Constitutionality of Statutes or Ordinances Making One Fact
Presumptive or Prima Facie Evidence of Another, 162 A.L.R. 495 (1946 & Supp. 2014)
(collecting cases).
32. J. Chase Bryan et al., Are Non-Economic Caps Constitutional?, 80 DEF. COUNS. J. 154
(2013).
33. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So.2d 156, 165-71 (Ala. 1991) (ALA. CONST. art.
I, §§ 1, 6, 22); Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So.3d 894, 901 (Fla. 2014) (FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 2); Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232, 1236 (N.H. 1991) (N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 12);
Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 474 (Wis. 2005) (WIS.
CONST. art. I, § 1).
34. Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So.2d 1080, 1087-90 (Fla. 1987) (FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 21).
35. Moore, 592 So.2d at 159-65 (ALA. CONST. art. I, § 11); Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery,
P.C v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 223 (Ga. 2010) (GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, $ XI(a)); Lakin v.
Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463, 474-75 (Or. 1999) (OR. CONST. art. I, § 17); Sofie v. Fibreboard
Corp., 771 P.2d 711,716-21 (Wash. 1989) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21).
36. LeBron v. Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 908 (I1. 2010) (ILL. CONST. art. II, §
1) Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1078-81 (Ill. 1997) (same).
37. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 31, art. XVIII, § 6; ARK. CONST. art. V, § 32; KY. CONST. § 54;
PENN. CONST. art. III § 18; WY. CONST. art. 10, § 4(a).
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The unemployment distress presumption does, however, face
different constitutional law challenges. The Due Process Clauses of
the U.S. Constitution demand, for any legal presumption, "some
rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact
presumed," such that inferring one from the other is not a "purely
arbitrary mandate."38 In Leary v. United States (1969), the U.S.
Supreme Court read this doctrine to demand "substantial assurance
that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved
fact on which it is made to depend."3 ' Similarly, both before and after
the U.S. Supreme Court declared its "rational connection" test, some
state supreme courts declared that a rebuttable legal presumption
would violate their respective state constitutions if the proven fact
had an arbitrary relationship to, or had no tendency to prove, the
presumed fact.4°
The "rational connection" test usually assumes two discrete
outcomes: Given the proven fact, the presumed fact is either true or
not true. In contrast, unit distress level is a continuous variable, and
therefore can take on an infinite number of values. Accordingly,
suppose the doctrine requires the party challenging the
unemployment distress presumption to show that it is "more likely
than not" that the average unit cost of distress equals the true cost of
the plaintiff's unemployment distress. Given an invariant distress-to-
dollars exchange rate, this reduces to the requirement that it be likely
that the average unit level of distress equals the true level of the
plaintiff's unemployment distress.
The problem: There is a zero probability that the average unit
distress level implied by the presumed amount will exactly equal any
one of those infinitely possible values for the true unit distress level.
To illustrate, suppose Plaintiff A is presumed to have suffered $200
worth of distress, or 100 units of distress, given a $2 distress-to-dollars
exchange rate. What is the probability that Plaintiff A actually
38. Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Ry. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43-44 (1910) (U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1); see also Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 25 (1913) (U.S. CONST.
amend. V). For statutory presumptions, a rule of deference tempers this requirement: "[i1n
matters 'not within specialized judicial competence or completely commonplace,' judges must
accord 'significant weight' to a legislature's capacity 'to amass the stuff of actual experience and
cull conclusions from it."' Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 33 (1976) (citation
omitted).
39. 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969).
40. R.E.H., Constitutionality of Statutes or Ordinances Making One Fact Presumptive or
Prima Facie Evidence of Another, 51 A.L.R. 1139 § 11(a) (1927) (collecting cases). For post-
Turnipseed cases, see, for example, Griggs v. State, 73 So.2d 382, 386 (Ala. App. 1954);
Hamilton v. State, 329 So.2d 283 (Fla. 1976).
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suffered exactly 100 units of distress, as opposed to, say, 100.1 or
100.01, or 100.001, and so on? Since the unit distress level can take on
an infinite number of values that do not exactly equal 100, that
probability is zero. As a result, the unemployment distress
presumption cannot meet the "rational connection" test in its original
form.
In theory, we can modify the "rational connection" test in
cases like these to require that it be more likely than not that the
proven fact (here, the average unit cost of distress) is close enough to
the presumed fact (here, plaintiff's true unit cost of distress). If the
constitutional doctrine governing presumptions is best justified as
advancing adjudicative accuracy, then we can decide whether the
presumed amount is "accurate enough" by setting some interval that
contains that presumed amount, and then estimating the probability
that the true value (here, the plaintiff's true unit cost of distress) falls
within that same interval. For example, if the average unit cost of
distress is $100 and the interval is [$90, $110], then that average unit
cost is "accurate enough" if there is a greater than fifty percent
probability that the plaintiff's true unit cost of distress is between $90
and $100.
There is, however, no a priori way to set the accuracy interval
without making at least some assumptions about the shape of the
distribution of the true unit cost of unemployment distress among the
set of prevailing plaintiffs. To illustrate, suppose we set the interval by
the number of standard deviations from the average unit cost of
unemployment distress. If unit distress cost follows a normal
(Gaussian) distribution and we set the accuracy interval as one
standard deviation from the mean, then we can conclude that the
presumed unit cost is "close enough" to the true unit cost, because
any particular unit cost (selected at random) is about 68 percent likely
to be within one standard deviation from the average unit cost. On
the other hand, if unit distress cost follows a multimodal or
asymmetric distribution, it is less clear that any particular unit cost is
more likely than not to be one standard deviation away from the
average.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a rebuttable presumption for deciding
unemployment distress damages. When a plaintiff suffers
unemployment distress because of the defendant's illegal conduct,
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judges and juries would have to presume an amount of
unemployment distress specified by (1) the average unit cost for
unemployment distress, as estimated based on past awards for
unemployment distress and (2) the amount of time the plaintiff spent
unemployed. Once this presumption triggers, the burden of
production would shift to the parties to produce enough evidence that
the plaintiff suffered (or should be deemed to have suffered) less or
more than the presumed amount. If no party can rebut the
presumption, then the judge must award the presumed damages
amount for the plaintiff's unemployment distress.
The paper then identified relative advantages of this
presumption. First, since it covers only unemployment distress, it is
simple to apply. Second, its likely anchoring effect on juries will
reduce the variance of jury awards for unemployment distress,
thereby increasing their predictability. Third, it can avoid the
constitutional obstacles that face damages caps and other laws that
constrain jury discretion. To be sure, constitutional law does require a
presumption to have a "rational" connection between the proven fact
and the presumed fact. Here, the unemployment distress presumption
may satisfy a modified doctrine that requires that it be likely that the
average unit cost of distress (the proven fact) be close enough to the
plaintiff's true unit cost of distress (the presumed fact). This depends,
however, on the assumed shape of the distribution of the unit cost of
unemployment distress among prevailing plaintiffs.
